By Gene Stoltzfus, CPTnet
Despite its size, the Pakistani military is ill prepared for the kind of war it faces in Swat Valley or the other boundary areas of Pakistan. For sixty years, all of Pakistan has sacrificed to reinforce its military for the purpose of defeating India in Kashmir and, if necessary, on the Punjabi plain. To complement this overwhelming focus, the Pakistan military sought to defeat its enemies on its west frontier like the Soviets and the Soviet successors in Afghanistan through proxy armies and guerilla forces unified under the label “Taliban.”
The Pakistani military has been reluctant to abandon its carefully nurtured asset, the Taliban. In Swat and other border areas, Taliban checkpoints and operations were often coordinated with the Pakistani military. The fact that the Taliban were Muslim brothers, albeit militant activists, was not necessarily troubling to military commanders. In fact when some military groups received orders to attack and kill Taliban, selected officers resigned because of their conscientious objection to killing Muslims. During my recent visit, I was told of soldiers killed in battle who were not honoured for their service when their bodies were returned to their native villages because they had died in a war against Muslim brothers.
This history of the Pakistani military and the current nation-wide engagement over the question of what it means to be a Muslim nation brings us to the present. The United States government has set aside 736 million dollars to build a new fortress embassy and refurbish its consulates in Pakistan because of the deteriorating security situation. The US has also targeted $400 million for counter-insurgency assistance for Pakistan this year and $1.5 billion in assistance to Pakistan for the next five years. Even for the U.S. government, which has gotten into the habit of throwing around money casually in Iraq, this adds up. The expenditures suggest an absence of confidence that the Swat operation will be completed in one or two months, that in fact it will go on for months, maybe years. Pakistanis share a similar lack of confidence in American advice, because of the inconsistent and sporadic nature of U.S. aid and reliability over the last sixty years. This regional conflict, which also includes Afghanistan, is now Obama’s war and it could destroy his administration if things unravel.
Certain wise South Asian commentators on the current situation, some of whom educated me on this trip, will probably be silenced and imprisoned in the coming months, but their spirits will endure. Our work on this side is to find ways to lift the veil of secrecy. This situation is complex but complexity should never deter us from working through the fog to the pull towards authentic reconciliation. Most of all, Pakistan needs space to sort out its own priorities and determine how Muslim convictions can energize it into the future. Another quirky U.S. green zone, Marine guards, civilian contractors, and advanced digitized security gimmicks will not create this space.
